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Abstract 
This paper investigates the role of the national institutional setting of EU member 
states in explaining Single Market non-compliance regarding non-tariff barriers in 
intra-EU trade. This study uses data on infringements to Single Market law on the 
free movement of goods. After controlling for country and industry-specific factors, 
we show that domestic institutional characteristics are relevant to explain non-
compliance ensuing from trade protection measures implemented by EU countries. 
While government independence from political pressures and higher levels of 
representativeness and accountability reduce the propensity of member states to 
infringe upon Single Market laws on the free movement of goods, better regulatory 
quality increases the probability of non-compliance at industry level, suggesting that 
increases in competition generate protectionist measures that violate Single Market 
law.  
Keywords: Single Market, institutional setting, non-compliance, trade protection, 
non-tariff barriers, count data models. 
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1. Introduction 
Although the European Union (EU) is a common market, intra-EU protectionism 
persists, as governments continue to adopt national protectionist measures that do 
not comply with Single Market legislation. Using data on infringements in the Single 
Market that result from member states’ use of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs) in EU 
cross-border trade, this study analyzes the role of institutions in explaining Single 
Market non-compliance.  
Two decades after the implementation of the Single Market Program, EU 
member countries still do not comply with Community law on the free movement of 
goods by using protectionist measures, particularly NTBs. Various studies point out 
to the existence of NTBs affecting the free movement of goods in intra-EU trade. 
Pelkmans (2011), Aussilloux et al. (2011) and Kox et al. (2007) ascertain that the 
Single Market is still hampered by barriers to market access that impact on the level 
of market integration. Chen (2004) and Chen and Novy (2011) showed that NTBs 
persist in certain EU industries and that they increase border effects, with a negative 
impact on intra-EU trade.  
This paper looks at non-compliance with the two basic EC Treaty articles on the 
free movement of goods in EU cross border trade (articles 28 and 30, presently 
articles 36 and 38 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU). Article 28 stipulates 
that quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having equivalent effect 
shall be prohibited between Member States, while article 30 establishes the 
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exceptions to the rule of free movement of goods1 clarifying that they should not 
constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade 
among member states. Member states’ NTBs constitute non-compliance with these 
articles, therefore complaints to the EU Commission about NTBs that result in an 
infringement proceeding serve as a proxy for the use these protectionist policies 
among member states.  
Our study contributes to fill several gaps in compliance research identified by 
Angelova, Danwolf and König (2012) recent research synthesis on compliance 
findings. First, it addresses compliance in the Single Market, a dimension 
understudied in compliance literature that only recently has been subject of analysis 
(Egan and Guimarães 2013, Guimarães 2010). Indeed, compliance research has 
mainly focused on social (e.g. Hartlapp and Leiber 2010; Linos 2007)) and 
environmental policies (e.g. Börzel 2000; Koutalakis 2004). In addtion, it is a 
quantitative study on a specific EU policy field. Second, it researches 14 EU member 
states compliance records, including both Northern and Southern states. Moreover, 
our analysis includes evidence not only on cross-national differences but also on 
cross-industry variation in Single Market non-compliance. Finally, this paper 
explores whether member states’ institutions explain variation in Single Market non-
compliance ensuing from the implementation NTBs. While the literature on 
compliance in the EU has pointed out that differences in existing institutions of 
                                               
1 These exceptions are justified, for example, on grounds of public morality or public security, the 
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants, the protection of national treasures with 
historic or archaeological value, or the protection of industrial and commercial property. 
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member states have implications in compliance levels, no such evaluation has been 
carried out for Single Market compliance levels.  
Our results for Single Market non-compliance indicate that domestic institutional 
characteristics are relevant to explain non-compliance related to cross-border EU 
trade protection practices. While government independence from political pressures 
and higher levels of representativeness and accountability reduce the propensity of 
member states to infringe upon Single Market law on the free movement of goods, 
better regulatory quality increases the probability of non-compliance with Single 
Market rules.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the 
literature. Section 3 presents the empirical model and describes the data. Section 4 
presents the econometric approach and the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Institutions, compliance and trade protection 
This paper builds on several strands of literature on the role of institutions in 
explaining compliance in the EU and trade protection. Domestic institutional impacts 
in member states policies and Europeanization have been widely researched (e.g. 
Duina and Blithe 1999; Héritier et al. 2001; Börzel and Risse 2003). The literature on 
EU compliance particularly, has also identified the conditions under which 
institutions affect compliance records of EU member states (e.g. Giuliani 2003, Hille 
and Knill 2006, Börzel et al. 2010), but it has not explored how institutional setting 
impacts on member states’ compliance records pertaining to EU cross–border trade 
legislation.  
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The political science literature on institutional effects on trade policy is vast and 
dates back to Rogowski’s (1987) seminal contribution. Busch and Mansfield (2011) 
and Milner (1999) present two political science literature reviews on the political 
economy of trade.  This literature concludes that the institutional setting is relevant 
to understand cross-national differences in protection, but it has not explored its role 
in explaining the propensity to engage in protectionist behavior among a set of 
countries that belong to the EU Single Market that ostensibly prohibits protectionist 
policies. 
The traditional economics literature on trade protection shows that NTBs are 
used to supplement tariffs and are determined by political factors and industry 
characteristics (e.g. Ray 1981; Trefler 1993; Lee and Swagel 1997).  The protection for 
sale model by Grossman and Helpman (1994) initiated the generation of political 
economy models that have been widely used to explain why countries try to 
influence trade flows. While some recent studies have attempted to apply and tailor 
the model for the EU (Belloc and Guerrieri 2008), their purpose was to explain EU 
trade policy and not intra-EU trade protection. Interest groups influence on 
policymakers became a prominent explanatory factor of trade protection, and 
various studies (e.g. Goldberg and Maggi 1999; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000; 
Imai et al. 2009) have tested its empirical validity.  
On the other hand, the economics literature also points out that the institutional 
setting may affect markets and firms dynamics and consequently they may impact 
on trade policy demands from interest groups. In particular, domestic firms and 
industries in distress due to intra-EU competition or due to the domestic regulatory 
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framework may demand protection measures such as NTBs that infringe upon EU 
legislation on cross-border free trade. In fact, the regulatory framework in which 
firms operate (entry regulations, anti-trust or labor market policies, ease of doing 
business) is one of the relevant characteristics of the institutional setting that 
determines firms and markets outcomes (Djankov et al. 2002).  Characteristics of 
member states’ institutional settings may explain how responsive governments are to 
domestic industries’ demands for protection.  Access to politicians, their 
responsiveness to interest groups and the use of political influence to advance 
specific interests like trade protection are also correlated with the institutional setting 
(Kono 2006, Kono 2009, Ehrlich 2007).  Another institutional feature that conditions 
firms and markets dynamics is the strength of a country’s legal system and its ability 
to enforce contracts and protect property rights (Laeven and Woodruff 2007).  
Our research builds on these various strands of literature on the effects of 
institutions on trade protection and on compliance with EU law. Our main 
contention is that the institutional setting may drive trade protection among EU 
member states and particularly may explain member states’ variation in non-
compliance with Community legislation on the free movement of goods that results 
from the application of NTBs.  
By exploring various dimensions of the domestic institutional setting this study 
provides a comprehensive account of the role of national institutional features in 
explaining protectionist behavior among countries that belong to the EU Single 
Market where non-tariff barriers are forcefully prohibited, and it also offers an 
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opportunity to make comparisons among a more homogenous group of countries in 
terms of their political systems.  
3. Empirical model, data and econometric approach 
In our model of non-compliance with the free movement of goods in intra-EU trade 
we focus on both country-specific and industry-specific determinants, emphasizing 
among the first, various characteristics of the domestic institutional environment. 
The reduced form of our model is thus specified as: 
 jtijtjtijt ,,f ZXI=NTBs  (1) 
where, NTBijt denotes the prevalence of non-tariff barriers based on the number of 
infringements in industry i of country j at time period t, jtI  is a vector of institutional 
variables that vary across countries and time period, and ijtX  and jtZ  are vectors of 
industry- specific and country-specific control variables, respectively.  
3.1. Infringements at country- and industry-level 
NTBs constitute infringements to EU law as they violate articles 28 and 30 of the 
EC Treaty on the free movement of goods. Therefore, non-compliance can be taken as 
a measure of protection.  Similarly to the UNCTAD database on non-tariff measures, 
our source of information is based on complaints and notifications (Bora et al.  2002), 
in the present case to the EU Commission. Anyone may place a complaint against a 
member state in relation to national measures or practices that violate Community 
law and under article 226 of the EC Treaty (258 TFEU) the Commission may open an 
infringement proceeding. By initiating bilateral contacts - issuing letters of formal 
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notice followed by reasoned opinions - the Commission tries to bring the 
infringement to an end; if the member state resists it may refer the case to the 
European Court of Justice. Our data refers to those cases the Commission issued at 
least a reasoned opinion. 
This inventory approach allows for estimates of the frequency of Single Market 
non-compliance, however, do not intend to quantify or infer their impact in terms of 
trade flows, nor do they provide information on the seriousness of the infringement 
in terms of its trade distortion effect. Indeed, as Mansfield and Busch (1995: 735) 
caution, “unlike tariffs, NTBs have no natural measure of intensity”. 
The data on infringements was collected from the Annual Reports on Monitoring 
the Application of Community Law and supplemented with the following EU 
publications: ‘Décisions de la Commission sur l’Application du Droit 
Communautaire’, ‘Internal Market – Infractions to the Free Movement of Goods’, and 
various issues of the ‘Single Market News’.  Therefore, our study includes 
exclusively situations of non-compliance with Treaty provisions, and does not 
comprise infringements upon sectoral harmonized rules (directives and regulations). 
As these non-compliance cases are not related to late or incorrect transposition of 
secondary EU law, it can be said that these infringements are non-accidental and 
result from a deliberate protectionist intention.   
Our data has two major advantages. First, it covers all infringements to the free 
movement of goods opened by the EU Commission. Second, the infringements refer 
to both products and production processes. However, this data set has several 
limitations. First, the number of infringements may underestimate the actual NTBs 
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existing in intra-EU trade, as they only capture violations that have been reported to 
the Commission. Second, the data set does not contain information on the specific 
type of non-tariff barrier used. Third, the infringements are not described with the 
same detail throughout the database, therefore in our own transcription of each 
infringement into the ISIC product classification we were constrained to using the 2-
digit classification. Our data comprises a panel of 14 EU countries2 and 20 industries 
for the period 1994-2002.  We observe 368 infringement proceedings.  
The empirical distribution of the number of infringement shows interesting 
features of the data. Firstly, over the observed period, zero is the median and the 
modal, most frequent value, implying that a significant number of member countries’ 
industries did not violate the free movement of goods at some point in the period.  
Overall, non-compliance ensuing from the use of NTBs appears not to be a highly 
frequent phenomenon, although there are some heavy infringing countries. 
Secondly, the variance significantly exceeds the mean, motivating a careful choice of 
the econometric approach. Finally, despite the number of infringements range from 0 
to 15, nearly 90% of country-industry pairs record zero infringements. These features 
support the use of count data models. 
Another interesting feature of the data is the notable variation in the incidence of 
infringements across countries and industries. The three heaviest infringers (France, 
                                               
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Netherlands, Spain, 
Portugal, Sweden and United Kingdom. Luxembourg was excluded due to lack of data. 
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Italy and Germany) are EU large economies suggesting that large and politically 
strong member states are more able to avoid compliance and adopt a protectionist 
behavior, even against pressure from EU enforcement authorities, as they may 
benefit more from non-compliance with Single Market free movement of goods than 
small economies. In fact, the slightest infringers (Denmark, Ireland and Portugal), are 
three of the four EU countries in our study with lowest GDP. This data seems to 
provide support for the argument that small economies may not have the market 
power to benefit from optimal trade protection (Mansfield and Busch 1995).  
The results also show that non-compliance varies considerably across industries 
and appears to be concentrated in a reduced number of industries. The three heaviest 
infringing industries account for 71.8 per cent of the infringements over the period. 
They are the food, beverages and tobacco industries, which are strongly engaged in 
lobbying national governments for protection (see, e.g. Goldberg and Maggi 1999), 
and where consumer safety concerns are often used as justification for illegitimate 
market protection. The food industry, particularly, is traditionally quite protected in 
the EU, not only in trade with third countries, but also in intra-EU trade; it is also 
subject to high levels of Community harmonization, which seems to indicate that 
member countries’ infringements upon the free movement of goods are a form of 
circumventing existing EU harmonization.  Conversely, intra-EU trade infringements 
are almost non-existent in wood and cork, leather and footwear industries. The great 
variability in the number of infringements across industries clearly indicates that 
non-compliance with free movement of goods in the Single Market is also industry-
specific. 
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3.2. Measures of the institutional setting 
We consider four variables that cover the political, economic and legal aspects of 
the institutional setting. Specifically, the empirical variables are regulatory quality, 
rule of law, government effectiveness, and voice and accountability (Table 1). These 
variables are only available by country. Our main goal is to examine whether they 
explain why industries in some countries tend to resort more to NTBs that infringe 
upon the free movement of goods than in other countries. 
According to the political economy models, protectionist trade policies are very 
much the result of political interests, which either emanate from certain interest 
groups or from politicians in the government. Voice and accountability (VACC) 
measures the degree of representativeness, i.e., how well the population and 
organized interests can make their voices heard and how mature and well 
established the political system of country j is. Thus, we can expect that the better 
these features of the institutional setting are, the less the power restricted groups in 
society will have. We expect a negative relationship between this variable and a 
country’s propensity to use infringements related to the use of NTBs. 
A country’s government effectiveness also has an impact on economic activity. 
The better the expertise of bureaucrats and the better and quicker decisions are 
made, the lower the costs and more easily domestic and foreign investors can go 
about their business. Better government quality also means higher transparency in 
public administration and higher independence from political interference. 
Therefore, we can expect the ability of pressure groups to lobby for Single Market 
non-compliance to be reduced. As such, the variable government effectiveness 
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(GEFF) is expected to have a negative relationship with non-compliance resulting 
from member states’ trade protection measures. 
The economic regulatory framework in which firms operate is one of the relevant 
institutional characteristics that determine firms and markets outcomes. For instance, 
a strong anti-trust policy would be expected to reduce market power by reducing the 
size and power of incumbents (see, e.g., Kumar et al., 1999). Labor market regulation 
may also have strong impacts on markets dynamics. Rigid labor regulation may 
impose a disproportionate burden on younger and smaller firms (Davis and 
Henrekson 1997) by increasing adjustment costs in the labor market. On the other 
hand, market regulation has also been seen as a means by which large incumbent 
firms maintain their rents. Carlton (2004) argued that high entry costs may be 
imposed specifically to protect incumbents connected with the political elite. 
A good quality of the regulatory environment (RQUA) would imply regulations 
that foster competitiveness and market entry. Firms and industries that attain high 
levels of competitiveness would lessen the use of political pressure for trade 
protection. However, a good quality of the regulatory environment may also leave 
some domestic firms and industries in distress. In this case, they would increase 
political pressures for trade protection. Hence, the distributional consequences of the 
regulatory environment might determine the strength of political pressures for trade 
protection resulting in infringement cases to the free movement of goods. In this 
sense, the qualitative impact of the regulatory environment on trade protection 
cannot be anticipated, remaining an empirical question. 
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Another institutional feature that conditions firms and markets dynamics is the 
strength of a country’s legal system, its ability to enforce contracts and protect 
property rights, and the strength of a normative belief that a rule ought to be obeyed 
regardless of whether it suits instrumental self-interests. Kumar et al. (1999) found 
that countries with greater judicial efficiency have larger firms, especially in low 
capital intensive industries. As strong rule of law implies higher transparency of the 
judicial system as well as better law enforcement, we expect lobbying activity to be 
less successful. Moreover, the sense of moral obligation associated with strong rule of 
law would imply a higher inclination of member states to comply with EU norms 
(Gibson and Caldeira 1996). The variable rule of law (RLAW) measures the quality of 
law enforcement in country j and we expect it to have a negative impact on non-
compliance resulting from protectionist measures.  
These institutional indicators were collected from the World Bank Governance 
Indicators database, where the concept of governance is understood as the traditions 
and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised (Kaufman 2009: 2) and 
includes three main dimensions - the process by which governments are selected, 
monitored and replaced, the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies, and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions 
that govern economic and social interactions. The indicators are constructed to have 
a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in each period. A higher value is 
indicative of better governance or stronger institutions. These measures are averaged 
over the years 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002. Table 1 shows a description and some 
statistics of the institutional indicators. 
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Insert Table 1 here 
First, one should note some variation across countries with respect to their 
institutional setting. Second, the institutional characteristics with the highest 
variation across countries are, in the following order, government effectiveness, rule 
of law and regulatory quality; voice and accountability has the lowest variation. This 
seems to indicate that institutional characteristics relating to law enforcement, 
bureaucracy, and regulatory practices have a more important role in explaining EU 
cross border trade protection than the degree of representativeness in the political 
system. Third, the institutional features in which the fourteen EU countries have on 
average better performance are government effectiveness and rule of law, whereas 
the quality of the regulatory context has the lowest mean value. This is an interesting 
finding because most of the regulatory changes intended to increase harmonization 
within EU countries have been driven by the Single Market Program.  
The results denote that despite the 1992 Program member states’ regulatory 
quality is still wanting, which may be related to some resistance by EU member 
states’ to changes in Single Market law. This argument is in line with Commission 
evaluations and with the literature on compliance with EU secondary law that show 
that member states tend to delay the adoption of new regulations, and tend not to 
correctly and fully transpose directives (European Commission 2009; Börzel et al. 
2012; Mbaye 2001; Treib 2008).  
 
3.3. Control variables 
The vector of industry-specific control variables includes a measure for import 
penetration (MPEN), which is expected to have a positive effect on non-compliance 
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ensuing from trade protection measures, as we follow Karacaovali and Limão (2008) 
in assuming that all the industries are politically organized to demand some kind of 
trade protection. 
The degree of intra-industry trade (INTRA) is another factor that would affect 
firms’ incentives to lobby for trade protection. Arguments based on economic 
distributional consequences of trade suggest that firms in a market where intra-
industry trade prevails would lobby less vigorously for protection than firms in a 
market characterized by inter-industry trade. As intra-industry trade entails less 
redistributive effect and lower adjustment cost than inter-industry trade (Thede 
2007), firms in a market with high intra-industry trade would gain less from trade 
protection and hence would have little incentives to lobby.  
However, Gilligan (1997) argues that lobbying becomes a private good for the 
firms in a market where intra-industry trade prevails, as they are a monopolist in 
their particular variety and have no incentive to free-ride. The product differentiation 
that characterizes intra-industry trade reduces the number of firms protected by a 
particular trade barrier and thus increases the incentives for firms to act politically in 
a market where intra-industry trade prevails. The net impact of those economic and 
political incentives for firms lobbying for trade protection is theoretically ambiguous 
and hence an empirical issue.  
The relative size of the industry in the economy (VASH) is as a proxy for its 
political importance and power. In addition, previous evidence has shown that 
industries with high capital intensity and human capital have more protection than 
labor intensive industries and/or with less skilled workers (Trefler 1993; Goldberg 
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and Maggi 1999). As such, the vector of industry-specific control variables comprises 
also the variable research and development intensity (RDINT), expecting industries 
with higher R&D intensity to be more demanding of protection.  
The vector of time-varying country-specific variables comprises variables 
measuring the relative economic size of the 14 EU member countries (GDPSH) and 
their wealth level (GDP). Previous literature provides various arguments to why size 
and income affects countries trade policies (see, e.g. Mansfield and Busch 1995; 
Steinberg 2002). 
The industry-level data comes from OECD Stan database. Our sample includes 
all manufacturing industries at the 2-digit level of the ISIC Rev. 3 classification, 
except ‘manufacturing not elsewhere classified’ (ISIC 36 and 37), which being 
residual has been excluded; other industries have been aggregated due to lack of 
data.3 The country-level data, GDP and population were collected from OECD 
Statistics. 
3.4. Econometric approach 
The non-negativity and discrete nature of the dependent variable – number of 
infringements – and its high frequency of zeros compel us to apply count data 
models. In these models, the observed heterogeneity is incorporated into the model 
through the mean, such as 
                                               
3 Food Products, Beverages and Tobacco (ISIC 15-16); Textiles and Textile Products (ISIC 17-18); Pulp, 
Paper, Paper Products, Printing and Publishing (ISIC 21-22); Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 
Products (ISIC 27-28); Electrical and Optical Equipment (ISIC 30–33); Transport Equipment (ISIC 34-
35).  
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    jtijtjtijtjtijtjtijt exp,,NTBsE ZXIZXI    (2) 
where Ijt is a vector of institutional variables, Xijt and Zjt are vectors of control 
variables, and ,  and  the conformable vectors of coefficients. For all control 
variables, the estimation procedure uses one-year lagged measures, which are 
predetermined for contemporary levels of infringements and attempt to mitigate 
potential endogeneity problems. 
Before discussing the estimates, we need to choose a count data model that deal 
with the particular features of the data – overdispersion and excess zeros. Alternative 
count data models seem substantially reasonable but they are econometrically 
different and are not necessarily easy to compare. Either unobserved heterogeneity, 
or a process that has separate mechanisms for generating zero and nonzero counts 
can produce both overdispersion and excess zeros in the raw data (Cameron and 
Trivedi 1998).  
In the context of non-compliance with EU free movement of goods, zero 
infringements may occur in a given year, industry or country but a positive count 
could have been registered. On the other hand, some industries do not register any 
infringements and that will never occur given their industry-specific characteristics. 
They represent the group of “certain zeros”. Therefore, industries/countries will look 
identical in the response variable but they have arrived at the same outcome through 
two different processes. 
To account for those two different generating process, the zero-inflated (ZI) count 
models generate two separate models and then combine them. First, a logit model is 
generated for predicting whether or not an industry/country would be in the group 
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of “certain zeros”. In our model, industry-specific characteristics seem to be the chief 
determinants of the prevalence of zero outcomes and the different probabilities of 
transition from zero to positive number of infringements. Then, a count data model is 
generated to predict the counts for industries/countries that are not “certain zeros” 
based on equation (2). Table 2 shows tests and model fit statistics appropriate to 
comparison between alternative econometric models. 
Insert Table 2 here 
The Vuong (1989) test strongly prefers the ZI count data models over the Poisson 
and the negative binomial model, respectively, suggesting that there is a separate 
generating process for the zero and nonzero. Either the ZI Poisson or the negative 
binomial model could account for both the overdispersion and the excess zeros in the 
data, although these model fit statistics indicate that the negative binomial model is 
preferred over the ZI Poisson model. Together, these pieces of information lead to 
the choice of the ZI negative binomial model (ZINB). 
Table 3 shows estimates for the selected models along with clustered standard 
errors, which allow for cluster-robust inference. To handle country-specific effects, 
the clustering was based on country-year groups. By clustering along these two 
dimensions, observations may be correlated within each country and each time 
period, but must be independent across countries and time. 
Insert Table 3 here 
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 4. How relevant is the institutional setting? 
Our estimates strongly suggest that after controlling for industry-specific 
characteristics the national institutional setting has an important role in explaining 
non-compliance resulting from member states’ intra- EU trade protection measures. 
Voice and accountability (VACC), government effectiveness (GEFF) and regulatory 
quality (RQUA) are statistically significant, indicating that the institutional setting 
has power to explain the prevalence of infringements in intra-EU trade at industry-
level. The negative estimate of government effectiveness (GEFF) suggests that a high 
degree of independence from political pressures and quality of policy formulation 
and implementation reduces the propensity of EU countries to use non-compliance 
as NTBs. A similar effect is found for the degree of representativeness and freedom 
(VACC), indicating that the better this characteristic of the institutional setting, the 
less responsive governments will be to domestic industries demands for protection. 
Conversely, the positive relationship between regulatory quality (RQUA) and 
prevalence of infringements means that the higher the regulatory quality the higher 
the probability of EU countries resorting to trade protection. These estimates suggest 
that increases in competition in the domestic market are motivating protectionist 
measures towards external competition, namely by using national regulatory 
barriers. These results corroborate previous evidence that domestic pressures are an 
important determinant of protection (see Becker and Theuringer 2001) and seem to 
be consistent with the view that in more industrialized and sophisticated economies 
subtler forms of capture and ‘legal corruption’ exist, and undue influence is often 
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legally exercised by powerful private interests which influence national regulations 
and policies (Kaufman 2009).  
With respect to control variables, we find that the country’s relative size 
(GDPSH) contributes to explain protectionist behavior among EU countries resulting 
in non–compliance with Single Market legislation on free movement. This evidence 
is consistent with Mansfield and Busch (1995) that show that larger countries display 
a more pronounced interest in protection than their smaller counterparts.  
On the industry-level side, the higher the import penetration ratio (MPEN), the 
share of intra-industry trade  (INTRA) and R&D intensity (RDINT), the lower is the 
probability of compliance with free movement of goods in intra-EU trade. 
Interestingly, MPEN and INTRA appear to be relevant to persuade a member state 
not to comply with free movement of goods, but they fail to explain the prevalence of 
a positive number of infringements. This result should, nonetheless, be read with 
caution as the lack of data on lobbying activity in the EU has compelled us to 
consider that all industries in the economy as organized, assuming that one way or 
another all industries exert some sort of pressure on  policy makers. With respect to 
R&D intensity, the estimates provide clear evidence that R&D intensive industries 
also have a higher demand for protection (cf. Ray 1981; Goldberg and Maggi 1999) 
and suggest that governments tend to protect those industries, whose firms profits 
they weigh quite heavily. 
For robustness, we check if our results are sensitive to different types of 
industries by constructing two sub-samples, one for top infringing industries and the 
other for the lowest infringing industries. In both cases, and using the same statistical 
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procedure to choose the appropriate count data model, the statistical information 
leads to the choice of the negative binomial model. The estimates are also reported in 
Table 3.  
Overall, dividing the sample provided qualitatively similar results on the 
influence of the national institutional setting on compliance with Single Market 
legislation. This reinforces the empirical support for our main contention that the 
institutional setting explains member states’ compliance with Single market law. The 
estimates show that government effectiveness (GEFF) and regulatory quality 
(RQUA) are relevant to explain non-compliance in both types of industries. 
Interestingly, the top infringing industries report a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between the import penetration ratio and the number of 
infringements, suggesting that the traditional political economy hypothesis could be 
adequate to describe protection for some industries in intra-EU trade. On the other 
hand, non-compliance associated with the less infringing industries seems to be 
significantly influenced by the degree of intra-industry trade. In these industries, 
holding everything else constant, the degree of intra-industry trade seems to strongly 
increase the incentives for firms to act politically, lobbying for trade protection based 
on non-compliance with the free movement of goods.  The R&D intensity variable 
retains its statistical significance and positive association with non-compliance across 
sub-samples, whereas the industry value-added appears with a negative association 
with non-compliance suggesting that industries with some competitive leverage are 
less likely to engage in non-compliance. 
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5. Conclusions 
This paper aims at assessing whether EU member states institutional setting is a 
driving force for trade protection in intra-EU trade measured by non-compliance 
with the free movement of goods within the Single Market. We analyzed non-
compliance cases with the free movement of goods among 14 EU member states over 
the period 1994-2002. Despite some limitations the data offered a unique opportunity 
to study trade protection across countries and industries of the EU common market 
that ostensibly prohibits protectionist practices, and does it and over time. As our 
dependent variable is a count variable and does not measure intensity or impact of 
protection, this study does not intend to assess whether non-compliance in one 
country is more (or less) harmful for the free movement of goods than in another 
country. Yet, several of our conclusions confirm the importance of the national 
institutional setting of EU member states to explain Single Market cross border trade 
protection.  
The estimates strongly suggest that higher government independence from 
political pressures reduces the propensity of EU countries to use NTBs that infringe 
upon the free movement of goods. Similarly, the better the government 
representativeness and accountability the less responsive it will be to domestic 
demands for protection. As such, government effectiveness and accountability 
facilitate compliance with the free of movement of goods among EU member states. 
Conversely, the higher the country regulatory quality the higher the probability 
the EU member state will resort to trade protection, suggesting that increases in 
competition in the domestic market motivate protectionist measures against other 
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EU member states. Domestic firms’ lobbying spawns national regulatory barriers that 
impair the free movement of goods. This result suggests that the ability of national 
governments to formulate and implement policies and regulations that promote 
competition among firms appears not to cross national borders.  
These results provide EU policymakers with an argument to improve the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation in EU countries and to deepen integration 
of the Single Market. The ability to shape policy decisions that advance trade 
protection seems to be mainly driven by economic interests of national firms, which 
are well-matched with political pressures against foreign competition. To EU 
policymakers this suggests the need to better synchronize the deepening of the Single 
Market with member states´ interests by forcefully addressing and monitoring non-
compliance. 
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Table 1. Description of Explanatory variables and descriptive statistics 
Variable Description 
Mean Std. 
Dev 
Min Max 
Institutional  variables 
    
RQUA Regulatory quality: ability of the government to effectively 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
facilitate doing business and promote competition and private 
sector development. 
1.234 0.343 0.284 1.925 
RLAW Rule of law: extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society; in particular, quality of contract 
enforcement, police and courts, and likelihood of crime and 
violence. 
1.546 0.454 0.162 2.047 
GEFF Government effectiveness: quality of public services, of civil 
service and degree of its independence from political 
pressures, quality of policy formulation and implementation, 
and credibility of the government commitment to such 
policies. 
1.680 0.496 0.164 2.501 
VACC Voice and Accountability: extent to which citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, freedom of 
expression and association, and free media. 
1.290 0.211 0.583 1.703 
Control variables 
    
Industry-level variables 
    
MPEN Import penetration ratio, i.e., imports/(imports + output - 
exports). 
0.570 2.098 -34.52 57.46 
INTRA The Grubel–Lloyd index for industry I, calculated as 1-
(|EXPO-IMPO|/EXPO+IMPO)); varies between zero (pure 
inter-industry trade) and one (pure intra-industry trade). 
0.761 0.205 0.108 0.999 
VASH Value added share of industry i relative to the total economy. 0.079 0.332 -0.000 3.563 
RDINT R&D intensity, calculated as the ratio of R&D expenditures by 
industry to its production. 
1.142 2.037 0 13.206 
Country- level variables 
    
GDP Logarithm of GDP, per capita, USD, millions, constant prices, 
constant exchange rate. 
2.971 0.303 1.893 3.406 
GDPSH Ratio of a country GDP to total EU GDP. 0.069 0.067 0.002 0.195 
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Table 2. Tests and fit statistics for alternative count data models 
Models   BIC  AIC Vuong statistic 
(p-value) 
Decision 
Poisson vs. NegBin 82.6 0.07 - NegBin preferred over Poisson 
Poisson vs. ZI-Poisson 59.3 0.07 4.14 
(0.000) 
ZI-Poisson preferred over Poisson 
NegBin vs. ZI-Poisson -23.3 0.002 - Negbin preferred over ZI-Poisson 
NegBin vs. ZINB -11.5 0.01 2.66 
(0.004) 
ZINB preferred over NegBin 
ZINB vs. ZI-Poisson -11.8 -0.01 - ZINB preferred over ZI-Poisson 
Legend: NegBin: negative binomial model; ZI: zero-inflated; ZINB: zero-inflated negative binomial; BIC: Bayesian information 
criterion; AIC: Akaike information criterion.  
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Table 3. Count data estimates of regression coefficients along with standard errors 
 
NegBin ZINB 
Top infringer 
industries  
Bottom infringer 
industries 
 NegBin NegBin 
Variable Estimates s.e. Estimates s.e. Estimates s.e. Estimates s.e. 
Count equation         
Institutional variables        
VACC -2.106** 0.996 -2.103** 0.995 -1.321 0.894 -4.016 4.497 
GEFF -0.951*** 0.240 -0.979*** 0.260 -0.953*** 0.232 -1.177* 0.667 
RQUA 1.427*** 0.452 1.335*** 0.454 0.954** 0.422 2.811* 1.691 
RLAW -0.275 0.368 -0.231 0.378 0.129 0.357 -2.329 1.733 
Control variables      
 
MPEN 0.007 0.021 -0.035 0.033 0.391** 0.190 0.002 0.021 
INTRA 1.188*** 0.426 0.273 0.510 0.134 0.523 2.608*** 1.010 
RDINT 0.286*** 0.034 0.195*** 0.042 0.076*** 0.026 1.044** 0.535 
VASH  -0.218 0.259 -0.508* 0.278 -0.833* 0.440 -3.269** 1.361 
GDP -0.015 0.021 -0.024 0.021 0.005 0.020 -0.057 0.125 
GDPSH 2.600* 1.371 3.205** 1.352 5.360*** 1.511 -0.061 7.904 
Intercept 0.010 0.690 1.633 0.670 0.173 0.664 1.022 1.923 
Inflate equation      
 
MPEN - - -2.315* 1.279 - - - - 
INTRA - - -2.100* 1.101 - - - - 
RDINT - - -0.693*** 0.141 - - - - 
VASH  - - -0.941 1.068 - - - - 
Intercept - - 2.732*** 0.914 - - - - 
Dispersion 
parameter () 2.091*** 0.415 0.946** 0.362 0.712*** 0.222 3.747 2.426 
No. obs. 1266  1266  490  580  
Log-likelihood -651.5  -639.3  -451.3  -52.9  
Wald test for 
goodness-of-fit 134.2***  84.57***  61.91***  40.37***  
McFadden 
Pseudo-R2 0.086  0.102  0.065  0.199  
Notes: s.e. means clustered standard errors that allow for correlated residuals among industries in the same country and at a 
moment in time.  Based on robust t-values, *,  ** and *** mean that coefficients are statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 
1% significance level, respectively. 
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